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' i I PREFACE 
I Some people seem to have a "knack" for being military leaders 
I without even half trying. Others really have to work at the job. Mo.st: 
commanders who are considered successful appear also to be better 
I able to communicate. 
I Since the principles of theoretical public relations contain 
communicative techniques to attain understanding, it seemed that there 
I might be a relationship between being a successful military command=: 
I ,and the employment of public relations fundamentals in the skilled 
hands of the military information officer. 
I Consequently, this thesis presents the author 1s concept of public 
I relations by examining .what makes a public relations practitioner,. 
reexamining the elements of military management, reviewing. the use 
I of public relations fundamentals by historically successful military 
I . leaders, analyzing the returns of a survey made among the general 
' officers of the United States Air Force about their requirements for a 
I public' relations practitioner, and presenting conclusions based on all 
I these factors. 
It is hoped that this thesis will be used as a reference guide for 
I bcith present and future military commanders, and for both present and 
I future military professionals in the field of public relations. 
R. N .. D. 
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I CHAPTER I 
I WHAT IS A PUBLIC RELATIONS MAN? 
I The term "public relations 11 is confusing. It means different 
I ~hings to different people, but almost everyone agrees that it has $omething to do with ''communications ... 11 And since communications--
I who says what to whom for what reason--have been part of every thread 
I in the development of civilization, it is no wonder that confusion exists 
' when attempts are made to define the communicative endeavors of 
I people who now specialize as public relations practitioners. 
I Even if there is agreement in defining the functions, techniques, 
or the results of public relations, there quite frequently remains 
I disagreement over the choice of a label to describe the area of 
I agreement. Different labels mean different things; and then again, 
they mightnot, But there appears to be a common denominator in spite 
I of the compounded confusion: the public relations label does have 
I something to do with effective communication. 
To better understand what the public relations man does we should 
I find out what forces made his emergence both possible and necessary. 
I There are several ways to approach this, and one of the ways is 
liistorically. 
I Down through history, in every age, man's progress in civilization 
I can be measured by his ability to communicate his ideas, his needs, 
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2 
and his wants. 1 One does not have to be a historian to recognize that 
even the crudest efforts of existence require some kind of communication. 
Nor does one have to be an intellectual detective to recognize that the 
art of communication has been with us for some time--in fact, probably 
f.rom the beginning. This art of transmitting verbal and written images 
has always been the exchange of opinion, expression, or interpretation 
between two or more people. Be it Adam, Sun Tzu Wu, Plato, Gautama, 
Charlemagne, Columbus, Shakespeare, Lincoln, Einstein, Churchill, 
or JohnQ. Public communicatinKwith superiors, equals, or subordinates-
the basic intent has always been influence. Scholars, historians, 
archaeologists, anthropologists, and journalists will supply such 
evidence at the rise of an eyebrow. 
As grunts representing feelings became distinguishable language, 
the art of expression took a giant step forward. For many years, 
however, communication was limited by the face-to-face, mouth-to -ear, 
personal transmission, Then almost overnight, the technical means of 
communication were changed. The fifteenth century innovation of the 
printl.ng press with movable, reusable type allowed for a wider 
dissemination of influence. 
I 1courtland Canby and Nancy E. Gross (eds.), The World of 
!#story (New York: The New American Library, 1954), p. vii, from 
' The Introduction" by Allan Nevi1;1s. 
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Historically several seconds later, the stage was finally completed 
for public relations to come into its own. This was the Industrial 
Revolution. Steam, harnessed to wheels revolving on tracks gave mass 
production the method to exist, to obtain greater quantities of raw' 
materials, and to distribute finished products to more people. The 
$ecrets of wire telegraphy and voice transmission were also unlocked 
providing further impetus to man's technical ability to communicate not 
bnly more rapidly, but also to greater audiences. 2 
However quickly these events might appear historically, it was 
flOt until the turn of the twentieth century that concern necessitated the 
development of what is, now called public relations. The forces created 
by the Industrial Revolution caused the problem in business; anci it was 
business solving the problem that created the need for public relations. 
' ;But this development did not occur easily nor spontaneously. 
Before the Industrial Revolution, this country 1s colonists ,had 
l:ormed themselves into several collections of small communities. 
' 
:Practically everyone knew everyone else- -itt least within each community. 
jThis ,cradle-to-grave familiarity was necessary for survival, and 
business was a personal matter. How a man ran his business was his 
2Harold F. Faulkner, American Political, and Social History 
I(New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1945), p. 403. 
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4 
own affair--so to speak.3 Howhelived, howhetreatedhis help (if any), 
:'-nd how he controlled his product quality and quantity was something 
that all could observe for themselves. What he said and what he believed 
kbout this or that was something that almost everyone could evaluate 
themselves. 
As the population expanded, so did business. Small outfits 
gathered together into bigger organizations. As the frontiers were 
pushed back, the economy enlarged and businesses became bigger yet--
not only to compensate for the increased markets but also to incorporate 
' 
the benefits of mass production techniques. The earlier personal 
contact of doing business was trampled (and necessarily sacrificed) in: 
the ru.sh to increase production. The public--both employee and 
customer--lost its contact; and with this loss of communication came 
the loss of understanding in business activities which were later 
translated into suspicionary highlights during the age of trusts and the 
:so-called robber barons of industry. 
Since it is a fundamental characteristic of human nature to look 
with suspicion upon anything not understood, the rise of those social-
political forces that eventually brought about certain changes in the 
conduct of American business are not necessarily too difficult to observe .. 
3Milton Wright, Public Relations for Business (New York: 
:Whittlesey House, 1939), p. vii. 
' 
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Some of the changes were the result of governmental regulations against 
monopolistic practices; some were regulations affecting interstate 
commerce. Led by Theodore Roosevelt, who recognized an opportune 
political advantage when he saw one even if he was physically near-
sighted, economic leaders were forced to rearrange the conduct of 
business. They also became aware, rather belatedly, that they should 
regain that public support which had either been lost or had become 
hostile.4 In any event, business became the concern of everyone. 
Ever since, all sorts of people, both fit and unfit, in all sorts of 
circumstances, both good and bad, have been seeking to limit or guide 
business enterprise in a manner that fits their own particular aims. 
If he didn't realize it yesterday, the businessman now realizes--often i 
more fully than his critics--that he does have a responsibility to society 
that is more than just doing business. Generally speaking, he is now 
trying with more or less success to meet that obligation (as he interprets 
it); but his efforts--sincere and earnest though they may be--are 
hampered by the antagonisms of those who distrust him. This distrust 
is founded upon the actions of all peoples since antiquity, whenever the 
effectiveness of communicative efforts bogged down. Business at the 
turn of the twentieth century could claim little trust. 
4scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations 
(Znd ed,) {Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1958), 
pp. 18-28; and Faulkner, op. cit., pp. 549-567. 
I 
I 6. 
I Today we can reflect upon the need for public relations activity 
I ~n past situations, but the need at that time by the people concerned was . 
not so much a so dally responsible ideal of effective communications. 
I but rather the need to immediately gain favorable changes in public· 
I ppinion. They had a personal stake in their business and it was threatened 
because mass production demanded favorable attitudes by both actual 
I 8..nd potential custome;rs. Business could not continue otherwise; nor 
I could it expand. 
The public must have confidence in the products of business to 
:generate a desire to purchase. To establish or restore that confidence, 
' 
I businessmen of that day took certain steps which eventually explain the 
,need for mod.ern day public relations. At that time however, almost· 
I :total concentration to regain the public's confidence was made in.publicity: 
I ·and advertising efforts. Some of the efforts backfired; but some· 
.efforts--geared to the public's interest of that time, like the restoration 
I 'of confidence in the Rockefeller name--were very successful. And 
I there slowly emerged a recognition by economic and governmental 
,leaders (along with an awareness by the public) that there was a difference 
I between publicity just for publicity's sake and a policy of keeping the 
. ----
I ipublic informed on the basis of an honest, socially responsible attitude. 
'However, even this attitude has not escaped certain .criticism. The 
I ' present label of "motivational persuasion" creates problems. The 
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i . 
general public now however recognizes the fact that influences are 
i 
1.lways at work attempting to mold or create public opinion. It seems 
that if the public is convinced that the force behind these motivational 
influences is honest and sincere and fundamentally operating within the 
boundaries that recognize the interests of the public, then the public 
will not necessarily be hostile towards that effort even though it may: 
be organized. 
. Thus the publicists at the turn of the twentieth century regained 
· public confidence for both their employers and their own vocation- -and 
they lai.d the groundwork for the development of modern public relations • 
The need arose within an economic world, the need still exists primarily 
within the economic ways of life, and modern definitions of public relation.s 
are very closely tied to business as a philosophy of management. In 
reality, this is a social concept of doing business with a primary 
emphasis upon human relations factors which Canfield summarizes in 
this way: 
Public relations is first a philosophy of management--an attitude 
of mind which places the interests of people first in all matters 
pertaining to the conduct of an industrial or social service 
organization, bank, utility, trade or professional association. This 
philosophy conceived that an enterprise should be operated and 
directed to serve the interests of all segments of the public ... 
a new social concept of management that seeks to attain the success 
in dealing with human beings which has characterized our material 
and scientific progress in the last hundred years. 5 
5Bertrand R. Canfield, PublicRelations, Principles, Cases, and 
Problems (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956), p.T. 
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8. 
Prudentlyhis definition should be qualified. While modernpublic 
relations is concerned with both the approach and the application of 
obtaining effective communications, the result of public relations is 
· hnderstanding and,support through public opinion and . .interest orientated 
i 
goals. A great numb~er of observers and practitioners agree with this 
qualification. 
To achieve the goals of effective communication--understanding 
and influence--the public relations practitioner must be able to utilize 
the technical aspects of communication. He must be able to employ all 
I 
~he techniques from face-to-face transmis sian to mass media saturation, 
<J-S and when needed .. And he must be proficient in interpreting public 
' qpinion reactions so that he can fulfill his role to his employer. 
However expert he may be in any of the communications fields, 
the public relations practitioner need not be an expert in all of them. 
J;Ie can hire publicists, reporters, and opinion sampling experts--but 
lie must know how to coordinate, guide, and evaluate their efforts. 
He must be a master in the techniques of effective, understandable 
communication. His working tools include opinion measurement, 
propaganda ability, and mass media discernment. Many specialists 
have mastered one or more of these areas of communication without 
+oourlng pubUo <ui•tiono pm<Wone<O- -<n up'<u of iliui< d•im• 
lotwit.hstanding. What is it then that is needed besides an obvious skill 
in communicative ability? 
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Like the management that employs him, the public relations man 
must develop a socially responsible motive for his communicative : 
prowess. Because they happen to be different type human beings, the· 
~egree of development may vary; owner -management types might be : 
~ore socially responsible than public relations types, or vice-versa. 
;rn any event, the P\lblic relations practitioner must develop such 
;tttitudes to fulfill his communicative obligations. Otherwise he is a 
mere communicator who may be expert--but a public relations man he 
is nbt. 
' 
By assimilating· these .attitudes from .. business that recognizes 
his need and worth, he is also made a part of management with 
inner actions and interactions that develop him as their eyes, ears, and' 
~oice. He is part of management but does not manage; he is the alter 
ego of management, because would not he be someone who generally 
thinks as they do and acts as they do .more so than one who opposes 
them? And would not he be more attracted to work for that type of an 
organization where he finds those principles and actions with which he' 
pan identify as his own rather than in opposition to his own? The 
psychologist agrees in the terminology: 
alter ego: n. (L., the other I) a friend so close that he seems 
a .second self. 6 
j ~or ace B. EnglishandAva Champney lpnglis.h, :A Comprehensive 
bictio'nary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), p. 24. 
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As the alter ~ of management, the public relations practitioner 
i.s fulfilling a role that is different than that of other communicative 
experts. He is part of management. He diligently and honestly strives · 
for understanding and support through communications in the public 
l.nterest; and he conscientiously evaluates the measurement of public 
' ppini.on in his employer 1s interest. And above all, he is motivatedto 
p-se his communicative prowess by socially responsible purposes that 
ilre compatible with both his employer and the public interest. 
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CHAPTER II 
MANAGEMENT AND THE MILITARY 
Like public relations, the term "management" is also confusing, 
but to complete the definition of public relations an understanding of 
management is necessary. In the process, it is possible that some of 
' 
j;he confusion can be eliminated. 
Colloquially, many people refer to management as a group of 
people who deals with labor. Others have their frame of reference 
pegged to an executive who can take a two hour lunch period without 
~orresponding guilt feelings. Obviously, neither of these opinions· 
ex.plajns management. 
Since prehistoric times, man ha~ continually tried to alter other 
men's behavior. Past techniques were often brutally direct; grunts 
! ' ;were easily replacedwithclubs as a methodology. Gradually economic 
persuasion replaced the actual club--and as civilization progressed, it 
became more complicated so that economic persuasion was personified. 
:U, the forms of barter or wages as well as honors. 
The Industrial Revolution inherited this situation. By adding the. 
refinement of even greater specialization almost everyone in the Judean-
~Christian wori.d was divided into either one of two classes: worker or 
ranagement. What is really confusing to most people is .the simple· 
fact that everyone (even those who belong to management) are workers 
I 
I 
12 
I 1;oo; and everyone (even those who are workers) are managers at one 
I time or another. But the term "management" represents a broader·' 
':'-pproach in its organizational applications. Management is the force 
I that provides policy direction for an organization. In other words 
I ~anagement is organizational leadership. 
Any organization (industrial, governmental, or social) has some 
I kind.o£ leadership. It is usually assumed that the top positions within 
I i;he organization constitute such leadership because it is here where ~olicy direction emerges. But this leadership is not just a result of a 
I J;nere mortal taking up space on an organizational chart- -many factors 
I ':"Hl determine the selection of those who are management .. Many factors 
will also determine the retention of those executives who create policy 
I and direct the organization. 
I The construction of an organization creates the need for a symbol; 
6£ authority. Someone will head it because there is a requirement to 
I fulfill such vacancy. Otherwise the organization will not long continue 
I to function as an entity. Although the mere fulfillment: of a position 
vacancy is orte of the basic requirements 1 it does not in itself insure 
I leadership nor subsequent successful management. Other factors are 
I also necessary. 
Researchers generally agree that leadership is conferred upon 
I r individual by the other members of the organization in spite of 
I instances whereby the top management position might be inherited or 
I 
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13 
even :forced upon the organization because of economic sanctions .. For 
example, one psychologist has found that: 
Leadership is not a quality which a man possesses; it is an 
interactional function of the personality and of the social situation. 
A leader is a metnber of a group on whom the group confers a certain ' 
status, and leadership describes the role by which these duties are 
fulfilled. The effectiveness of the role depends upon the functional 
relation between the individual attributes of the man and the specific 
goal of the group at any moment. It is natural that some individual 
attributes of skill and personality will be generally effective though 
they will not confer upon their pos sesser universal leadership status .l ' 
PersonaLity will greatly influence the selection of one individual 
over another as a leader. This is a result of the inner action of human 
~elations factors, but some believe that "· .. emergence of a leader 
d.epends more on nature and purpose of group rather than personality 
of leader--butit takes interaction of both through communication which 
achieves social effectiveness. 112 The exact type of leadership the 
s.ituation demands will determine the type of personality the followers 
are seeking. 
Therefore management as personified by executives in leadership 
roles has at least four requisites: organizationalposition, personality, 
1cecil A. Gibb, J 1The Principles and Traits of Leadership, 11 The 
Journal of Abnormal and Soc.ial Psychology, Volume 42 (Albany, New 
York: The American Psychological Association, Inc., 1947), p. 284. 
2 J. F. Brown, Psychology and the Social Order: Anintroduction 
to the Dynamic Study o£ Social Fields (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1936), p. 344. 
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14 
situation, and authority; but also, management cannot long continue its 
leadership role without communication. 
There is no principle of executive conduct better established in 
good organizations than that orders will not be issued. that cannot or 
will not be obeyed. Executives and most persons of experience who 
have thought about it know that to do so destroys authority, discipline, 
and morale ..• when it appears necessary to issue orders which are 
initially or apparently unacceptable, either careful preliminary 
education, or persuasive efforts, or the prior offering of effective 
inducements will be made, so that issue will not be raised, the 
denial of authority will not occur, and orders will be obeyed. 3 
While there are several requisites for the creation of those who 
are management, it does not seem unrealistic to believe that effective 
communication is the key of survival for management's leadership. 
Although it's part of the answer, just technical ability to communicate 
is not sufficient in and of itself for survival; there is also a moral 
responsibility which management must convey. 
The distinguishing mark of the executive responsibility is that it 
requires not merely conformance to a complex code of morals but 
also the creation of moral codes for others. The most generally 
recognized aspect of this function is called securing, creating, 
i'nspiring of "morale 11 in an organization. 4 
The .aiin. of .. manage.ment· is to:.attain .. the goals of :the organization. 
.This applied .to .a. military. o"rganizatio;n holds .true and: can perhaps. b\l 
more easily examined because of the military structure than in some 
organizations. 
I 3chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press-,-1948), pp. 167-168. 
4Ibid., p. 279. 
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Military organization immediately implies authority to many. 
Authority in a management sense however.. carries the responsibility of 
morale which is really moral creativeness. And is not creativeness 
the essence of leadership as the result of human cooperation in 
organizations? And since an organization produces responsibility, 
authority automatically emanates. Military management is therefore 
not basically different than any other type of organizational management; 
and to those who fulfill the responsibilities ofmanagement, the military 
like other organizations, creates a type of executive called officer. 
Military officers who fulfill the responsibility role of military 
management have the obligation of furnishing leadership as do executives , 
of any organization. The military executive has .the same dual function i 
of providing authority through executive decisions and of providing 
moral purpose to the ranks. Only as long as these two functions are 
.fulfilled will leadership be in turn conferred upon the military officer--
regardless of his personality, the situation, or their interaction. 
The factors that create the need for, that govern the selec.tion 
of, and insure the successful continuance of those who fulfill the 
responsibilities of management are the same for any organization--
1.dustrial, military, 
products are different. 
or social. Only the ultimate organizational 
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CHAPTER ~II 
MILITARY MANAGEMENT PLUS PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Since we live in a world of misunderstandings, suspicions, 
resentments, and open conflicts, the importance of our (military) 
relations with others cannot easily be overlooked. Mankind has always 
in some measure been attempting to reconcile various attitudes, 
viewpoints, and temperaments among its members. During these 
attempts there have emerged many leaders, but there are only a few 
that everyone recognizes as being better than the rest. 
With all the many legions with all their various leaders, why 
should only a mere handful of military men ascend the ladder of 
leadership so that history singles them out? All the various leaders 
had been given the opportunity to fulfill a vacancy; all had a particular ! 
personality that attracted their followers; all were certainly aware of 
their immediate situation; and all had been invested with authority. 
Still, only a few are considered "great" leaders. These few had an; 
extra-something. Was it their ability to eifectively communicate an 
understanding and appreciation of their leadership? At least effective ! 
1ommunication has long been of concern to military men; and one of the 
1
ldest military treatises was so concerned. 
Writing about 500 :a c., Sun Tzu Wu explains how he was involved 
with the problem of gaining support for his military activities through 
I 
I 17, 
I ": demonstration o:( his communicative ability. Ho Lu, King of Wu--
I 
ih the middle-eastern part of China, west of Shanghai--summoned Sun 
Tzu to demonstrate his theories of warfare. Upon invitation, Sun Tzu 
I applied his theories to the test by demonstrating them with the concubines 
I 
of the King. The assembled 180 women {divided into two companies 
with the King's two favorites heading each group) did not seemingly 
' ' 
I "\nderstand simple commands like "left turn" or "right turn." Each of 
I Sun Tzu's orders was met by giggles. His theories of warfare were in jeopardy; and in spite of the King's objections, he ordered an on-the-
I s'pot beheading of the two leaders. Sun Tzu's orders were now obeyed 
I since they were explicitly understood, In spite of his sorrow, the King 
agreed that Sun Tzu knew how to get things done and appointed him as 
I h.i.s military chief. 1 
I Sun Tzu had an instinctive insight toward the problem of effective 
communication. He knew he must gain "public" support in terms o£ 
I 11publi,c 11 understanding for those activities that he believed vital. Others 
I clown through history seem to have been instinctively aware of these 
fundamentals--no matter how brutal the application of the technique may 
I appear to our present values. One of the "great" military leaders whose 
I i~stincts were in this vein also came from the Asian pages of history. 
I 1Lionel Giles (trans.) Sun Tzu Wu, The Art of War (Harrisburg,_ 
lennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1944), pp. 9-11.' 
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Genghis Khan, the Mongol conqueror, who rayaged Asia and led his 
p;eoples to forge one of the greatest empires the world has ever known, 
I 
! 
v.:as not only a military genius but also a most capable communicator. 
He knew how to reach each individual in terms of that individual's 
uPcl,<;>rstanding. Among followers he instilled respectful loyalty; among 
foes he instilled fearful respect. 
The ability of this .one man to alter human civilization is perhaps 
UfOre clouded in mystery than the actions of any other important leader. 
' Several reasons cause this, not the least of which is directly c.onnected 
tc\ his ability to communicate fear among his enemies through superstitions 
a\>d h;3.lf truths. Much of what is known about him today comes from 
: 
tljese sources of his foes and so therefore color his leadership qualities. 
Besides being a military genius--both in strategy and tactics--
Gbnghis Kl;>an was also the elected leader of his people. He fulfilled 
h~s leadership responsibilities by both leading his people to victory and 
by- providing them with a complete list of laws, Yassa Gengizcani. 2 
z 
Harold Lamb, Genghis Khan, The Conqueror, Emperor of All 
Men (New York: Bantam Books, Inc. ,1953), pp. 138-140, --- •· 
YassaGengizcani provided for many things. It rejectedallbelief 
except that there was but one God; it respected those dedicated to 
religious practice; it established the machinery for election of succeeding 
e+perors; it established a system of military divis.ions with mandatory 
conscription; it prescribed penalties for theft; it prohibited marriage 
bJtween cousins; and it prohibited Mongols being used as servant or 
sl1
1
ave. Other provisions are believed to exist but to this day are 
irromplete, 
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Contrary to popular belief, Genghis Khan did not make war on the 
world for religious reasons like Muhammad. He did not make war on 
t:\>e wo:rld for personal reasons like Alexander or Napoleon, He"was 
careful to preserve what he thought useful. 
He took from the world what he wanted for his sons and his people. 
He did this by war, because he knew no other means. What he did 
not want, he destroyed; because he did not know what else to do with 
"t 3 l • 
Genghis Khan created an empire. He employed his genius in 
military tactics by accomplishing the physically impossible, His legions 
could appear where it was impossible for them to be- -an expression of 
"followership" never before seen. His legions werF' loyal because he 
could appeal to them and give their shared primitive simplicity an 
understandable dedication. 
He reached his foes with the fear of annihilation even by numerically 
iillerior forces, in spite of historical references about the Mongolian 
horde of barbarians. According to Sir Henry H. Howorth's History~ 
the Mongols, Genghis Khan at his death commanded only an army of four 
cbrps which would be about 130, 000 men, and the greatest number he 
commanded in battle was never over 230, 000 men. 4 But .through his 
effective mastery of propaganda, punctuated with tactical impossibilities, 
he was able to effectively communicate fear upon his enemies. Unlike 
. 
3Ibid., p. 138. 4Ibid., pp. 142-143 . 
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Alexander, he was able to maintain his control over the conquered by 
using them to govern themselves-'-in a manner of his own design. 
While he lived his empire thrived. After his death his empire 
continued on until the death of his grandson, for Genghis Khan, unlike 
the first Caesar 1300 years previously, was not personally ambitious. 
Except for that one difference, Julius Caesar was another of the 
"great" leaders to whom we can look for an example of the combination 
of a military genius plus the skills of an effective communicator. The 
nine years .that mark his campaigns in Gaul set the stage for his 
ascendancy as the Roman dictator, for during those engagements his 
own accounts of his progress kept the homefolk informed of his military 
' 
prowess. When the inevitable civil war between him and Pompey 
exploded, Caesar's triumph seems to have been already guaranteed .• 
He could effectively comm\lnicate his lea,dership to both troops and 
populace. To his legions, he was a military genius concerned with their 
welfare; to his public, he was a practical politician who would (and did) 
overhaul the antiquated political system of Rome. 5 ·Consequently he 
was conferred with even more leadership which probably fanned the 
fires of his personal ambitions beyond control. 
I 5s.G.Brady, Lt. Col., USA, Retired, Caesar's Gallic Campaigns, 
I (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, 
I 1947), pp. xv-xxv. 
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However, in the fulfillment of his leadership role, he extended 
and solidified the Roman Empire. Somewhere along the way even in 
s;pite of brilliant communiques like "Veni, vidi, vici," (whenhe defeated 
F'harnaces at Zela), his personal ambitions replaced his communicative 
"touch." And like the first Napoleon, 1900 years later, he forfeited his 
leadership. 
Napoleon Bonaparte was also both a skilled militarist (of and 
before his time) and a skilled communicator. True, as in the case of 
eia.ch "great" leader under this discussion, the situation was ripe for such 
leadership that Napoleon provided, but the fact remains that there were 
ot.hers on the scene who were available to provide such leadership. 
Like others, Napoleon was able to plan brilliant .military tactics but it 
was he--at that time--who was also able to translate such efforts into 
u.pderstandable language which would motivate both soldier and citizen 
in supporting him. 
Among the many military men whom Napoleon admired, Hannibal 
was one• Assuming his first full command .the Corsican may have 
rf'called what the African-Phoenician general was faced with when 
cbnfronted by the same seemingly insurmountable Alps. In any event 
bpth were masters of communication at a crucial moment. Hannibal. 
did not deceive his men: 
Instead., he made things 
conviction to their souls. 
merely called the army to 
clear, and seemed to breathe his own 
For in the matter of the mountains, he 
an open field and there he brought the 
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Celtic envoys from across the Alps. They stood there in the bright 
hot sun, for every man to see. Th<)T answered questions and made 
speeches, and presently the soldiers understood that men and women 
and small babes had often made this pass age through the mountains •.. 
the General advanced to speak •.. he said the longest marches were 
behind us. We were to set out for the Alps at once and soon would 
be in Italy .•.. Such were the means that the General brought down' 
the mountains ••. to human scale ..• now the soldiers knew that men 
could eros s the mountains, but it was only faith in Hannibal that 
made them yield themselves to such a venture. 6 
Likewise. Nap.oleon did not deceive .his .men, Upon assuming 
command of the ragged, destitute, and dishearted troops who had all 
but suffered complete defeat in the Italian Alps, he rallied them with. 
an example of his communicative ability. 
••• Soldiers .•• you are naked and ill fed; the Republic owes you 
much, but she has nothing with which to pay her debts. Your endurance , 
and patience amidst these baren rocks deserves admiration, but it 
brings you no glory. I come to lead you into the most fertile plains· 
the sun shines upon. Rich provinces and great cities will soon be in 
your power; there. you. will. reap riches and glory-~th!"Y. will be at 
your disposal. Soldiers of Italy! with such a prospect before you, 
can you fail in courage and perseverance? 7 
Such communication must have had its effect. Napoleon's troops 
were able to defeat six numerically superior Austrian assaults, secure 
Italy to the French orbit and force Austria to recognize the new France 
as well as Napoleon's superior military (and communicative) abilities, 
His next major campaign was .to culminate in the conquest of Egypt. 
6Mary Dolan, Hannibal of Carthage (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1955), pp. 68-69. 
7 
Montgomery B •. Gi]:,bs, Military Career of Napoleon the Great· 
(Chicago: The Werner Company, 18 95), pp. 48-49. 
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Here again his ability to reach his followers was demonstrated. When 
a!J.l was in readiness, he c.alled his vast army together within sight of 
' 
the ships which would carry them from France. He s.aid to them: 
Rome fought Carthage on sea as well as on land; England is the 
Carthage of France. I have come to lead you, in the name of 
Divinity of Liberty, across mighty seas, and into distant regions, 
where your valor may achieve such life and glory as will never await 
you beneath the cold skies of the West. Prepare yourselves, soldiers, 
to embark under the tri-color .£or achievements far more glorious 
.than you have won for your country on the blushing plains of Italy. 8 
Napoleon then agreed to give each soldier seven acres of land in 
x;eward. Since his promises had always been kept before, it is reported 
that his soldiers heard him with joyous declarations of their acceptance 
o£ leadership: 11 Long live the Republic!" 
Before his star was orbitally sidetracked by his own overwhelming ' 
personal ambitions, Napoleon displayed another example of his ability 
to effectively communicate to his .followers--civilian oi military .. On 
the 15th of May in 1802, he spoke to the counselors of State to establish 
a tradition that still lives long after him. 
, •• You call these ribbons and crosses child's rattles--be it so •. 
It is with such rattles that men are led ..• , observe how the people 
bow before the decorations of foreigners. Voltaire calls the common 
soldiers 11Alexanders at five sous a day. 11 He was right. It is just 
so. Do you imagine that you can make men fight by reasoning? 
Never! You must bribe them with glory, with distinctions, and 
rewards .•.. If this Legion of Honor is not approved., let some other 
be suggested. I do not pretend that it alone will save the State, but 
it will do its part. 9 
8 . ' Ibld.' pp. 110-111. 9Ibid.' pp. 180-181. 
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After he lost his "touch" to effectively communicate, Napoleon 
also lost his genius for military stratagem and he probably had time to 
reflect upon the error of his ways. History reports that he did 
temporarily regain his communicative ability when he made his return 
from Elba, but a more able military man named Wellington was to 
prove that Napoleon's tactical genius was not to be recaptured. 
Perhaps if Napoleon's star had been on its ascendancy when he 
returned from Elba, his effect onhistory would have been greater than 
it was. Another of the "great" military leaders who also had the 
communicative "touch" was able to combine the promise and threat of 
his return into one of the greatest propaganda weapons of our civilization. 
General Douglas MacArthur, already a proven battlefield tactician as 
well as a brilliant staff officer, was recalled into service during World 
War II. Ordered out of his citadel in the Philippines, MacArthur 1s 
pronouncement, "I shall return," reached all--civilian and military, 
f:riend or foe. 
In spite of the recurring sagas that both rank and file categorize 
under general opinions about "dugout Doug," there is little evidence. 
that MacArthur's military ability is questioned. And his communicative 
ability is a matter of record. His one phrase represented the American 
e~fort to defeat the Japanese enemy- -molding all land, air, sea, and 
crvilian forces toward fulfillment of his promise. Even the enemy 
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respected his vow for not once did they ever ridicule either MacArthur 
the person or his pledge. 10 
One does not long examine the records of all the "great" military 
leaders without realizing that there is something more than just 
n;,ilitary ability that insures leadership in military management. Of 
the few who have been picked for this discussion, there is no attempt 
to disregard or discredit other favorites; the selection of these men 
b,as been dictated merely by the fact that they clearly represent the 
' 
' concept that military leadership necessitates at least two factors: 
I 
I 
:rhilitary agility and communicative ability. Others were on the scene--
~ther persons of military genius; but they did not rise to the heights of 
l:ieing "great" military leaders in.·.spite ·of the organizational si~uation, 
their. personality, or theh occup.ancy. oL a top position with inherent 
~uthority. Had they also been masters of effective communication, 
this author believes .that they too would have been considered "great" 
by their c~ntemporaries and by all men yet to come. 
In the fulfilLmen.t of their responsibilities, military management 
exe.cutives should therefore then be concerned .about military public 
relations. WJ,ile it in its.elf may not guarantee "great" military i 
radership, public relations --which is an effective understanding' 
I 
1
°Frank Kelley and Cornelius Ryan, MacArthur: 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
I 
Man of Action 
---1950), p. 143. 
I 
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I through communications that motivate opinion and support necessary 
I to successfully perform the mission--willmos.tcertainly_assist in the f1,:tlfillment of the responsibilities of military management. 
I Intelligently handled, military public relations will do its part for 
I military management for it is an integral part of that management. 
' 'l'op military leaders- -as represented by general officers--are perhaps 
I ;yell aware of this concept. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PUBLIC RELATIONS REQUIREMENTS 
OF AIR. FORCE .. MANAGEMENT 
Since most commanders who are considered succes'sful appear to 
cpncentrate upon being able to effectively communicate--their policies 
a;re understood, their attitudes are revered, and their orders are 
uj:>questioned law--it would be advantageous to inventorythe opinions of 
sj.tch a body of men and attempt to sample their attitudes about military 
management's use of public relations. 
Among the principles incorporated in theoretical public relations 
' bbth communication and understanding will always be evident. If an 
i 
i~ventory as suggested above did show a relationship between being a 
s~ccessful military commander and the employment of public relations 
' 
:f\\.ndamentals, it would seem to follow that a greater awareness of 
I 
public relations would assist military management not only to support 
public relations progran1s but also to better select the professional 
assistant who would design and carry out such programs. 
I. MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS SURVEY 
With guidance from the Communications Research Center, School 
o~ Public Relations and Communications, 
dlcided to concentrate any survey polling 
Boston University, it was 
efforts among a distinct and 
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rr).anageabl.e group of recognized, successful military commanders. The 
ai:tthor' s natural inclination was toward the Air Force where (during the 
rr).onth of October, 1959) there were 415 people on duty as general 
officers. Thi.s group of officers could by any test represent a 
I 
c?llection of "successful" military management; and quite obviously, 
I 
tliey also represented the present and future 11 employers 11 of Air Force 
i 
p~blic relations. 
' 
With such a large body of management globally dispersed it would 
be impractical to interview each officer individually. It would also be 
unfair to separate out only the "commanders" as a sample since almost 
! 
I 
aJ11 these officers (representing management's thinking) have had 
I 
' command experience regardless of present assignments. Therefore it t . ' -
i 
wf's determined early that the only practicable way to poll this group of 
~anagement was by mail survey~ tote. 
From the beginning the pitfall$ of constructing a mail survey were 
I 
I • d ry co gn.tze. . A survey must be to the point, but it must be flavored 
i 
with just the correct amount of intrigue to elicit a high response. 
Otherwise the time, money, and effort involved might be wasted, since 
"• •. i.n terms of numbers, the returns from mail questionnaires is 
u1uall.y quite small. 111 
I 1Mildred Parten, 
P;rocedures (New York: 
I 
Surveys, Polls, and Samples: Practical 
Harper &Brothers;J:950), p. 391. 
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During the design stages of the questionnaire, pre-testing was 
~onducted. Interviews with six randomly selected general officers and 
v?ith two high ranking (but not generals) Air Force professional 
I 
information officers were recorded for pre-testing purposes. This 
! 
h:elped refine the final development of the questionnaire. 
As a result of the pre-tests and the cooperation received from the 
Communications Research Center, it was decided that the best way to 
poll the attitud.es and opinions of the target audience would be by 
p;resenting a hypothetical problem that should invoke a military 
'fanagementanswer aboutmilitary public relations requirements. The 
q 1uestionnaire therefore created the hypothetical situation whereby each 
g'eneral officer respondent would be encouraged to select his own 
p 1ersonal staff information officer. 2 In this hypothetical situation each 
r,espondent waH supposed to have screened 20 potential information 
' 
o;fficers and had narrowed his choice down to five possible, available 
c1tndidates. In the processing each respondent was to have :made certain 
h'otes about each of the candidates, and he was now asked to make a 
2Public relations practitioners in the Air Force (and in other 
governmental agencies) are known as Information Officers --as this 
represents the traditional recognition by all American military men o:f 
tJ\.eir role as public servants. Such practice al~o acknowledges the 
Almerican military's philosophic obligation to keep the public informed 
Pfimarily through ethical communicat.ions of an institutional nature--
aroidi.ng the use of "press -agentry" techniques which are valid tools 
arailable to the civilian public relations practitioner. 
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i 
sl.ngle selection from "his" comments about the five. (See Appendix A 
for complete detai~s.) 
Each of the five candidates had something g.ood about him as well 
all something not so desirable, According to the pre-test results, the 
cil.ndidates would be more "human" if they weren't perfect and a greater 
I 
response of the reasons .for selecting one candidate over the others 
! 
' c'ould .be expected. The traits in which each differed could be generally 
! 
c'atego:dzedunder separate headings. Twelve divisions such as loyalty, 
e 1ducation, technical skills, personality, and management ability were 
! 
r:h.ade fo:J: purposes of analyzing the respondent's answers, Also, of the 
£tve· candidates, there were .originally only three, but slight changes 
were made in one or more of the categories to allow for a wide.r range 
of selection as well as to perhaps determine if certain changes would 
make any difference in selection. 
The effect of the position of each candidate on the page of the 
~uestionnaire was controlled. 3 An answer sheet respectfully requesting 
. tb.e respondent's reasons for selection was produced. A pre-addressed, 
:pre-stamped reply envelope was included in the final package (see 
Appendix A) which was mailed as an inclosure to a cover letter from the 
3Five qeparate questionnaires were produced so that each candidate 
was rotated to the first position at least once. Consequently each 
c;andidate therefore occupied each possible position once. For the 
complete results of how positioning turned out, see Appendix B . 
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Communications Research Center. Distribution of the different 
questionnaires was arbitrarily made alphabetically within each rank 
among the 415 general officers of the Air Force. The names and 
addresses (as of 1 October 1959)were furnished to the author by the 
Office of the Director of Information, Secretary of the Air Force. 
Mailing was completed by 16 October 1959 and the replies for 
purpose of this study were cut off on 20 November 1959. Of the 415 
questionnaires mailed, 295 replies were received by that November 
date .• The replies represent a 71.02 per cent return--over 56 per cent 
better than could usually be expected from a mail survey, according to 
the experienced, professional pollsters: 
, •. Katz and Cantril, in discussing the returns received by pu.blic 
opinion polls conducted by mail, reported that usually less than one-
·fifth of the mailed ballots are returned •• , • The American Institute 
of Public Opinion found the highest returns {about 40 per cent) came 
from peopl'e listed in Who's Who, while 18 per cent of the people on' 
telephone lists, 15 per cent of the registered voters •• .returned their 
ballots. 4 
There are probably several reasons why this survey produced 
such a high return. It could be that while this was a hypothetical · 
problem it was {or is) also a very real one to almost all general officers. 
It could also represent the fact that most general officers are quite 
fware of the role that public relations has in their management 
responsibilities. In any event, such a high return was very rewarding. 
I 
4 Parten, op. cit., p. 3 92. 
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Subsequent examination of this 71.02 per cent return was devoted 
tbward determining if the replies reflected a favorable distribution 
between respondents and non-respondents and the original population. 
Table I presents that picture by ranks. 
TABLE I 
SURVEY REPLIES BY RANK 
Ranks 
Questionnaire 
Population 
Total Per Cent 
General ..•..... 12 2.89 
Lieut. General ... 28 6. 74 
Maj. General .... 167 40.24 
Brig. General ... 208 50. 12 
Total 415 99. 99 
Respondent 
Population 
Total Per Cent 
9 3. 05 
19 6. 44 
111 37.62 
156 52 .. 88 
295 99.99 
Non-Respondent: 
Population ! 
Total Per Cent i 
3 2.50 
9 7.50 
56 46.66 
52 43.33 
120 99. 99 
By ranks the relationship between respondents and non-respondents 
and the original population of 415 general officers who received the 
questionnaire shows a favorable distribution picture. Since geographic 
distribution would not necessarily depict any significant distribution 
factors (because of the global£ unctions of the Ah Force), it was wondered 
if the returns within each command would produce any significant 
relationships between respondents and non-respondents. Therefore, to 
further analyze the distribution, a breakdown by commands was made 
4'-nd that picture is presented in Table II on the iollowing page. 
-------------- -----
TABLE II 
SURVEY REPLIES BY COMMAND 
---- ----- -
Questionnaire Respondent Non-Respondent 
Commands Population Population Population 
Total Per Cent Total Per' Cent Total Per Cent 
Joint Chiefs of Staff .................. 13 3.13 10 3.39 3 2.50 
Headquarters, US A F ............... 87 20.97 70 23.73 17 14. 18 
Air Defense Command .•............. 34 8.19 23 7. 79 11 9.17 
Air Materiel Command .............. 35 8. 44 27 9.15 8 6. 67 
Air Researah & Development Command .. 25 6.03 16 5.42 9 7.50 
Air Training Command .............. 16 3.86 13 4.41 3 2. 50 
A' U ' 't 1r n1ve:r:s1 y ..... ·. 4 •••••• ~ •••••••• 8 l. 93 4 l. 36 4 3.33 
Continental Air Command ............ 9 2.17 5 l. 69 4 3.33 
Military Air Transport Service ....... 18 4.34 12 4.07 6 4.99 
Tactical Air Command .............. 23 5. 54 15 5.09 .8 6. 67 
Strategic Air Command ............. , 43 10.36 28 9. 49 15 12.50 
Security Service .................... 4 0.96 2 0. 68 2 l. 67 
Alaskan Cmd; Alaskan Air Command ... . 3 o. 72 2 0.68 1 0.83 
Caribbean Air Command ..... , .. , .... 2 0.48 2 0. 68 0 0.00 
Pacific Air Forces .................. 21 5.06 13 4.41 8 6. 67 
Supreme Hq. Allied Forces Europe ... 10 2.40 7 2.37 3 2.50 
U S European Command ...... , ...... 4 0. 96 3 l. 01 1 0.83 
U S Air Forces Europe ...... , ....... 18 4. 34 12 4.07 6 4.99 
Miscellaneous Assignments* ......... 42 10.12 31 10.51 11 9.17 
Total. .............•............... 415 100.00 295 100.00 120 100.00 
*This total includes general officers assigned to Department of Defense, Air Force 
Academy, and other special duties not covered otherwise in the various commands. 
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Projecting the command breakdown further, a distribution profile 
a'S shown in Figure 1 was made from the data from Table II. Both show 
aJ fairly even correspondence between respondents and non-respondents 
ii;l proportion to each command's population of general officers, The 
~reatest discrepancy appears at Headquarters, Air Force, where a 
~ossible explanation might be the fact that they have a greater number 
o'f staff positions being filled by general officers than any other command. 
~ow ever, as the profile in Figure 1 shows, the relationship between 
! 
:riespondents and non-respondents with the total population consistently 
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forms the same pattern. Therefore on the basis of an analysis of the 
Jieplies by both ranks and commands, it can be safely assumed that the 
survey replies probably reflect accurately the total population. 
As mentioned previously, the position of each candidate on the 
page of the questionnaire was controlled. An inspection of this data in 
AppendixB will disclosethatposition itself didnotnecessarilyinfluence 
the various selections of the candidates. However, each respondent was 
asked .to select one of the five candidates as his information officer. 
Numerically, each candidate received one or more votes from each rank 
among the respondents, except no four star _general selected Candidate , 
E and no Lieutenant General picked Candidate B. The numerical 
selections of the various candidates are showed in Table Ill: 
TABLE Ill 
CANDIDATE SELECTIONS BY RANKS 
Ranks 
Questionnaire Respondent Candidates 
Population Population A B c D E None 
General. ....... 12 9 3 1 2 3 0 0 
Lieut. General .. 28 19 6 0 8 2 3 0 
Maj. General .•. 167 111 21 9 39 13 23 6 
Brig. General ... 208 156 21 24 63 18 27 3 
fotal 415 295 51 34 112 36 53 9 
Using the data from Table III, the bar graph in Figure 2 on the 
~ollowing page, shows clearly that Candidate C was picked by the majority. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
36 
o~ r.espondents. As showed in Figure 2, following, the numerical ranking 
I 
of selection for Candidates C, E, A, D, and B is in that order: 
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FIGURE 2 
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CANDIDATE SELECTIONS BY RANKS 
According to the data (Table III and Figure 2), Candidate C was 
ihe favorite choice of the respondents, It would be easy to therefore 
assume that his obvious traits (thbse attributes such as a B. S, in 
_Journalism, his exceptional fast ability to think on his feet, his ability 
to write, and his tendency to be an extrovert) are a true reflection o£ 
his role as the alter ~ of those general officers who selected him. 
At second glance, however, Candidate C 1 s background in J ournal.ism 
koesn 1t appear as overwhelming if Candidates A and E (both who had a 
Liberal Arts background) are combined for comparisonpurposes, Now 
104 o£ the selections almost equal the 112 votes for Candidate C; but by 
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further adding Candidates B andD to the totals, Liberal Arts bl'ckground 
received .138 votes and a Journalism background received 148. 
The preceding discussion is not intended to confuse. It is offered 
tb warn against making a visualinspection of just the numerical results 
of the respondents' selections and then making assumptions based upon 
data that appears to be obviously conclusive. 
As ,mentioned in Chapter I, the author's concept of a public relations 
practitioner is a person who is the alter ego of management; and as 
discussedinChapterii, managementis represented bypersons who are 
responsible for both policy and operation. In both instances, human 
beings are necessary; and therefore the reasons why one person was 
~elected over others will not be easily reflected in a numerical sense. 
Totals can be so reported, but reasons for human actions must be more 
10losely examined. As a .result {even from the beginning when this survey 
was initiated} a content analysis of the reasons for selections was 
envisioned. 
II. CONTENT ANALYSIS 
When the survey was designed, certain traits about the candidates. 
were created so that 12 separate general categories could be controlled. 
rhese 12 divisions such as loyalty, education, technical skills' 
~ersonality factors, and management ability were made for purposes of 
:analyzing the respondent's subjective reasons of selection in a more 
I 
'clear-cut manner. Almost every respondent's answer allowed the author 
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t,o catalogue the remarks into one or more of the 12 divisions. Only 
I 
' 
tmo s.eparate groupings of respondents did not follow this 1 'norm." Nine 
i 
officers elected to make a selection of a candidate without comment; 
and another group of nine officers elected not to make a selection, but 
fhey did offer their reasons. The :remaining 286 respondents all made 
selections and all offered their reasons of selection--permitting the 
author to have greater insight about their preferences for information 
6fficers and about their management opinions toward military public 
relations. Table IV reports the total number of comments by the 
respondents in each of the 12 categories: 
TABLE IV 
COMMENT TOTALS IN EACH CATEGORY 
Comment RESPONDENTS BY RANK 
Category General LieutGen MajGen Brig Gen TOTAI.J 
Education .............. 6 10 53 88 167 
I 
$peaking Ability>!; ..•.... 5 ll 57 76 149! 
Writing Ability ...•.•... 2 11 41 76 130 ! 
;Loyalty ..•.......•... · . 3 8 46 73 130 
Extrovert .•..•..•.•.•.. 2 10 29 59 100 
Gets Along with People .• 1 7 29 39 76. 
Creativity ....•........ 1 6 28 40 75. 
Well Read •.......••... 2 2 19 26 49 
Plans Ahead .......•... 0 4 21 21 45 
~elegates Authority ..... 0 5 24 24 45! 
ig Picture Concept •... 0 5 ll 17 33 
I tays in Background ..•. 2 2 15 12 31: 
I *This category also includes the subjective nuance of thinking on: 
[feet ability as well as the obvious ability to make public addresses. . 
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By inspection it is easy to see that over half of the r.espondents 
b,ad something to say about education or speaking ability of the candidate 
cif their choice. Slightly less than half the respondents were also 
influenced by the factors of loyalty or writing skill. Almost a third of 
the respondents had some comment about extroversion, while less than 
a, third commented about the candidate's abilityto get along with people. 
About the same number commented about creativity. 
That is one side of the coin, so to speak. If the numerical data 
ip. Table IV are presented in proportionate segments of a coin--as the 
tax dollar is often depicted--a clearer picture might be possible. 
Figure3, using the totalnumber of 1,030 comments as the basis for the 
qoin, is such a presentation. 
FIGURE 3 
PROPORTIONATE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMENTS 
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As mentioned previously, a deduction based purely on the 
numerical totals can be misleading. Therefore, the comments of the 
respondents were minutely re-examined. The comments in each category 
were weighed in an effort to determine the subjective relationships 
within and between categories as factors that influenced the selection 
of one candidate over the others; and by weighing these subjective 
n,uances, it was hoped that sufficient evidence would develop to either 
support or reject the author 1s alter~ concept of public relations. 
The following discussion therefore reports the results of the content 
analysis, and each part of the ''comment coin'' is rearranged to show its 
proportionate relationship with the total number of comments. 
Education comments. Comments about the educational background 
of the candi.dates received the largest number of total comments with 
"(XlOre than hal£ of the respondents mentioning this factor. 
demon.strates this relationship. 
OTHER 
COMMENTS 
FIGURE 4 
Figure 4 
I PROPORTIONATE DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION COMMENTS 
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Because more than hal£ of the respondends commented about 
education and because Candidate G was s.elected by almost half o:f the 
respondents, it might be easy to make a straight assumption that the 
educational background of Candidate G was the primary reason for his 
selection. However, as mentioned earlier, such assumptions based on 
pure. numerical data can be misleading even though it seems reasonable 
to make such a conclusion. 
For example, the respondents commented 167 times about 
education. Of these 167, a total of 143 respondents thought the type o£ 
O,egree was a leading factor in their decision or selection. Out of these 
143, a total of 96 made a strong preference toward the type of education 
backgroundpossessed by Candidate G with such comments as "· •. other 
things being equal, a background in journalism helps in press 
relations ... rr or; 
I have selected Captain "G •. " The only advantage he seems to 
have over 11E 11 is a degree in Journalism rathex than Libel·al Arts. 
Although I do not consider this a dominant factor in the selection of 
an information officer, it does give him an advantage in the knowledge 
of the medium in which he operates plus prestige in the press world. 
Among the remaining 47 respondents who also commented about 
education but stated a preference for Liberal Arts background, such 
rlemarks as "• •. a student [candidate BJ starting with a broad base 
crrriculum, he narrowed down to a selected major after he was sure 
o'f what he wanted .•. " and "· •• I want a public information officer 
I [Candidate A], not a press agent or a newspaperman .•. " prompted a 
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recheck of what appeared at first to be an obvious preference for a 
candidate with a journalistic background. What about those who didnot. 
express a beliefthat "· .. a major portion of his job will be the preparation 
of releases to news media representatives. " And how many might' 
believe, but did not comment, as the following: 
While a degree in journalism would make for a well qualified 
individual in newspaper and reporting fields, the liberal arts degree, 
in general should provide a better basis for the broad scope of a 
public information job where a "well-rounded" individual is required, 
who can better meet and deal with a great mixture o£ people with 
whom he would be associated. 
Therefore a recheck from a different tack than just the comments 
alone was made. All candidates were placed into either one of two 
categories,:!::~, Journalism or Liberal Arts. It was discovered that 
with or without comments, a total of 149 respondents selected a 
candidate with a Liberal Arts background; and a total of 135 respondents 
selected with or without comments those candidates with a Journalism 
background; and nine respondents made no selection. Thirty-nine of 
the respondents selecting Liberal Arts picked Candidate B who was a 
Journalism major so that it would appear that only 109 actually 
desired a straight Liberal Arts background in their candidate. However, 
11 who picked Band commented about their selection also said (as the 
following excerpt represents): 
I don't believe the exact academic degree or major are too 
important--rather the fact that the officer is well educated and has 
a winning personality, uses good common sense, and can manage 
his subordinates. 
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Consequently that leaves several officers (approximately 28) who • 
' ' 
!night be placed on either side of the scales. It therefore appears safe 1 
' 
' to assume that education is desirable but that the exact educational. 
):equirement is divided- -at least among the respondents in this survey .. 
' 
! 
It is not doubted that Candidate C was partly selected because of his · 
! 
~ournalism background, but Candidate E (who was almost identical 
~xcept for education) was also partly selected because of his Liberal 
I 
I 
I Arts background. After making a content analysis of the education 
I 
' ~actor and in spite of the large number of comments, it is the author's 
opinion that the educational background of the candidates was not the 
! 
V>ost influential factor of decision. Other factors besides education , 
' ~ave tipped the scales in favor of Candidate C. What were they? 
Speaking and writing ability comments. Technical communicative 
skills possessed by the candidates seem to have been among these factors. 
' :!figure 5 shows .the proportion of comments about speaking and writing 
! 
.ibility in relation to the total number of comment.s .. ' 
OTI-IE R 
COMME~TS. 
FIGURE 5 
PROPORTIONATE DISTRIBUTION OF SPEAKING 
AND WRITING ABILITY COMMENTS 
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The 295 respondents commented 149 times about speaking ability; 
(or thinking on feet attributes) and 130 times about writing ability. Of· 
the 149 remarks about oral performance, only 13 remarks could b~ 
,classified as negative. Such comments as "the fact that he is not a. 
!public speaker is totally unimportant as the most effective speaking is . 
,by peli'sonalities rather than hired mouthpieces," and "the Air Force 
!is in constant trouble because someone 'expresses himself on his feet"': 
:are representative of these 13 respondent's apprehensions. 
The other 136 remarks about speaking ability formed a pattern' 
reflected in comments such as a requisite 
' 
"· •. verbal fluency is 
' qualification for an 180 since he must create a favorable climate in. 
i 
!which to operate, a job that calls for many personal contacts," or i 
I 
i ' !" ... I prefer my information officer to be capable of making public: 
I 
!appearances including speaking engagements .... " 
I 
Whether having oral capability for purposes of advising the, 
:commander and other staff members in the matters of speaking or: 
having the ability for his own job requirements appears to be a matter' 
of the individual respondent 1s conjecture and experience. Perhaps most· 
opinions about this could be summarized with the remark which said: 
... because oral expression is his basic medium of successful 
accomplishment, I consider speaking ability vital--whether before 
two people or two hundred. 
In the other technical communicative skill, writing ability, 130 o:( 
re respondents thought it deserving of comment. This does not mean 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
45 
' to imply that it was discounted by the other 165 respondents, and it does 
I 
I 
f1Dt mean that writing ability was considered by all as a completely 
feparate category. Many remarks, such as 11 ••• expresses himself, 
!wen, both in writing and speech ..• 11 are indicative that .many respondents, 
! 
r;:ombine the technical skills of expression. 
' 
Several comments like' 
i' ... based on my opinion, professional ability in at least one element of 
' ' 
the public media is a highly desirable qualification in the public relations 
i ' 
! 
:field ... " tend to mold a conclusion that of the respondents who did· 
i 
' f:omment about writing skills, they picture their information officer as 
' I 
~eing very strongly grounded in writing prowess. 
However, along with others who expressed a desire for 11 ••• at 1 
least average ability in writing , 11 some 13 respondents did not particularly . 
~magine that this skill was as important as it might appear. Their 
sentiments could be represented thus: 
Wh:lle writing ability is, of course, an asset and will be frequently 
used, it is not as vital a factor as most people assume, Any good 
reporter will write his own story and if he receives a printed handout, 
he will. rewrite it. What he wants are facts, ideas, and the authoritative 
"feel" .of the subject. 
It is interesting to note that 91 of the 112 respondents who picked 
yandidate C made some comment about his. writing ability being in 
JTe1ationship to his Journalism education background. Obviously, these 
jespondents assume that a Journalism degree is synonymous with a skill 
f written expression. 
Jfthe technical skills--writing and speaking--'are grouped together, 
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'there are a total of 279remarks. Numerically at least, this would tend 
to give weight to an impression that technical skills were the deciding 
factors for selection since 91 votes for Candidate C and all 53 votes for 
:candidate E made mention of either speaking or writing abilities. Then· 
why did 121 other respondents (voting for Candidates A, B, and D) not 
:follow suit and make selections basedon technical communicative skills 
alone? Other factors besides technical skill in expression must have 
outweighed its influence. 
Loyalty comments. The next category of comments--in a straight 
numerical sense--was that concerned about loyalty. None of the 
respondents interpreted this comment about the candidates as ·having 
any connection with security clearance, nor was any such connotation 
intended by the author. Proportionately in regard to the total comments, 
Figure 6, the loyalty section of the "comment coin" looks like this; 
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FIGURE 6 
PROPORTIONATE DISTRIDUTION OF LOYALTY COMMENTS 
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Out of a total of 130 remarks about loyalty, 70 were fromi 
respondents who selected Candidates A or D, plus 14 who picked; 
Candidate C. One negative remark about loyalty was from a respondent: 
i ' jwho made a Candidate C selection on the basis that 11., .a loyal but stupid 
~nformation officer would be a horrible combination, " 
I 
Otherwise,, 
! 
~emarks such as 11 ••• loyalty is the key to this selection. , , 11 or ", , .as 
I f staff officer, loyalty should be above their own personal interests .•. 11 
~re representative of the 70 positively stated comments made by a 
! 
i:najority of respondents selecting Candidates A or D. 
' 
Only one 
' 
' fespondent who selected Candidate B commented about his loyalty being, 
lcceptable because "since it wasn't mentioned it must not be a factor." 
Fourteen o£ the respondents who selected Candidate C did take 
~nto cognizance the loyalty factor by what can be termed as a tolerant 
attitude or approach. For example, one respondent would have liked 
1
'<, •• to have quality of complete loyalty to the Air Force and Commander; 
without these qualities--in a really tight spot he will tend to think in 
I 
~erms of self interest. Sometimes the LSO has to take the 'pie -in-the- , 
I 
face' to save the ol' man!" The other 13 respondents who picked 
Candidate C but were bothered by his loyalty felt that it was a problem 
they could handle. For example: 
No officer steeped in Service ideals, as I am, will deny the 
impo,rtance of loyalty. All five officers have it to a reasonable degree. 
This quality can be measured only in relation to the object of such 
loyalty. It therefore becomes the duty of the commander to win 
loyalty to himself and the "cause." 
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Most of the remarks made by the 14 who selected Candidate C, 
and commented about loyalty tend to show a feeling that loyalty was a, 
,factor of "· .. guidance by the commander ... " or control of the 
j commander, They also tended toward the opinion that " ... this officer 
i 
!would get me in trouble occasionally, [but] we 1d get more done in the 
:long run, 11 
I 
While only 14 of the 112 respondents who selected Candidate C; 
':elected to comment about the loyalty factor, 34 of the 53 respondents ' 
iwho selected Candidate D (who also had a Journalism background} made· 
:mention of the loyalty factor in reference to technical communicative ~ 
:skills. Almost all of them, (31}, stated that speaking or thinking on:, 
' 
jfect ability was of such importance that the loyalty factor could be· 
!tolerated. 
On the basis of the loyalty factor, the content analysis appears to 
show that many were very strongly motivated by it in their selections. ' 
While loyalty by itself was not a decisive factor to many others, they 
were aware of it--andeither weighedit againstqualifications that were 
;more desirable to them or felt ·that it was a quality that could be 
developed or controlled. While it appears that loyalty did tend to 
greatly influence those who selected Candidates A or D, there did not' 
lppear to be enough evidence to indicate that Candidate C was selected 
ln spite of loyalty. Communicative prowess was more influencial. 
I 
But how influential. were personality factors? 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
49 
Personality comments. Numerically, in a descending order, the' 
bext categories of comments dealt with extroversion, getting along with 
):>eople, and creativity. Proportionately, in regard to the total number' 
'of comments, Figure 7 shows the personality segment of the "comment 
'coin" like this: 
OTHER 
COMMENTS 
FIGURE 7 
~PROPORTIONATE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONALITY COMMENTS 
Ranking fifth, sixth, and seventh in relation to total number of : 
comments, the personality factors- -extrovert, getting along with people, 
and creativity--totaled 251. This would appear to therefore be of ' 
1;remendous influence in the selection process, but a great number of 
these personality comments were linked either together or with other 
Jemarks. For example, 2 9 respondents who stressed loyalty would have 
nothing to do with an extrovert because "· .. an extrovert in this game 
I 1an be dangerous, " or 
work for me! 11 
"· .. don't want an extrovert--he's supposed to 
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However, as in the loyalty factor, some o£ the respondents felt 
;that extroversion was a controllable trait as 11 ••• I feel that with proper 
,guidance and supervision this tendency would be curbed." A total o£ 13 
.respondents so expressed such opinions summarizing that 11 •• , it would 
'be better to have an extrovertandrideherdonhim than one who wasn't." 
! 
The getting along factor with 76 comments was about evenly split' 
:between respondents who wouldn't have an extrovert and those who 
1
would. After studying this comment category, the author gained the 
';'feeling" that most o£ the respondents more or less assume that any 
! 
io££icer in the information career field would be able to "naturally" get 
!along with people- -more so than an officer not in this field. Therefore 
' 
'it appears safe to conclude that by itself, this personality trait was not 
1 
a sole factor o£ decision. One comment in particular mi.ght serve as· 
;an example: 
In my command, I would deem it essential that my choice be: 
somewhat of an extrovert. Since we furnish guidance to subordinate , 
units in military-civilian community relationships and spend a. 
considerable amount o£ time in the field, he should be able to get , 
along with people. · 
The other main personality £actor--creativity--was commented: 
'upon by 75 respondents. Here again however, the remark was qualified· 
in every case with such opinions like 11 ••• creative loyalty is desirable .. , 11 i 
rr II, • • a Creative extrovert WOUld• be the best officer for the job, II. 
One comment expressed the utop1an desire that 11 ••• an analytical. 
!creativeness in a sta££ information officer is perfect. 11 
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As a result of analyzing these three personality factors, the 
'author came to the conclusion that while together they totaled 251 ', 
!comments and would therefore appear to be more important than any, 
pther category as a factor of influencing selection, they were not by', 
themselves that influential because they were always made in connection 
with other attributes. Personality factors are important; but their· 
importance is as a qualitative measure in relation to other characteristics 
~f the individual--in much the same manner that the remaining five. 
categories were considered as qualifying a particular attribute. 
I 
Ot:her comments, The five remaining categories --staying in the: 
~ackground, planning ahead .• delegating authority, big picture c.oncept, , 
and well :;ead- -were certainly of some importance in influencing the ; 
I 
yarious selecbons. Compared to all other comments, Figure 8 shows ', 
their relative proportions in the "comment coin. '·' 
i 
' I 
I ALLOTHER. 
COMMENTS 
FIGURE 8 
PROPORTIONATE DISTRIBUTION OF OTHER COMMENTS 
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While these other factors probably may have had some influence. 
n the selection process, it can be reported that by themselves they' 
' 
were not deciding factors. They were always coupled together with' 
I 
ire marks concerning education, communicative skills, and the three 1 
previously mentioned personality factors. In only two cases did the 
nuance between "well read" and "very well read" actually tip the decision' 
to a partie ular c a11did,a te. 
While making the content analysis of the respondent's reasons for, 
' 
selection, the aut)10r began to feel that there could be other ways to also. 
' ' ;neas11-re why a pOirticulao: respondent would select a particular candidate. , 
For example, would years of command experience by itself tend to, 
I 
influence selection? And would presently assigned commanders tend to 1 
select a particular candidate because they are now in a command job?. 
Command experience influence. A breakdown by years of command:, 
'i'xperience for each respondent was made. Since this did not indicate 
~ny trends except to show that distribution of years of command · 
experience was adequately and proportionately related among all ranks 
of the respo11dents, it is not included in this study. 
As ml'!ntioned in Chapter I, it is the author's concept that the 
public relations practitioner is the alter ego of management in the field 
df motivati11g communications --being part of management without· 
t•noging. Thi• •umy -'•=nd hum fuo< nnnnnp< ond H w•• o.Uy 
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ogical that the next analysis should attempt to discover if all members 
pf military management--whether they are presently assigned as 
commanders or not- -had similar requirements for their ideal information 
officer. Therefore a breakdown of the commanders was made to analyze 
if their opinions were different. 
Commanders 1 comments_. To further analyze what the choices. 
and the reasons for selection by the commanders were in relation to 
the. choices and reasons of other general officers, a refinement in 
relation to functional mission was also made. Three groups were 
~rbitrarily made to generally describe the function of the unit being 
commanded: _1::e., headquarters units, such as Headquarters, U.S. A. F., 
<(nd special assignments; operational units, such as Strategic Air 
Command, and Tactical Air Command; and support units, such as Air 
Materiel Command. These divisions were made even th,ough it was also 
known that within each category there would be some disagreement since 
some units are truly "operational" although they belong to commands 
placed in the support category. However, it is believed that for general 
classification, the divisions are as fair as they can be. 
Therefore, using only the data from commanders, vice-commanders, 
or deputy commanders 
rlspondents, and total 
(the relationship between the respondents, non-
commander population) is reported in Table V. 
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~s expected, a great number of general officers occupy staff jobs' 
in the ~~eadquarters, special, and miscellaneous category; and of the 
I; 
' I' il25 respondents in this category, only 21 were used in the commander, 
'. 
breakdown. In the operational mission commands, there were more r 
commanders than there were staff.officers of general rank, 67 to 36. 
I 
In the support mission commands there was about an even split between' 
commanders and staff officers of general rank, 35 to 32. These 
comparisons are in relation to the total respondent population. For a 
lomparison to the total commander population as well as the original 
lurvey population, Figure 9 shows the proportionate distributions: 
------.. ----........-------- ~--- -~ 
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160 i 
To allow for a content analysis of the commander's remarks, a 
recheck and retabulation of remarks within the framework of the 
previously established 12 categories was made. Also tabulated were 
the candidate selections so that the commanders 1 choices could be, 
compared with selections made by all the respondents. The 123 selections 
of candidates made by the commanders compared favorably with the 
totals elections made by all respondents. Table VI shows this comparison: 
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TABLE VI 
CANDIDATE SELECTIONS OF COMMANDER RESPONDENTS 
IN RELATION TO CANDIDATE SELECTIONS 
OF ALL RESPONDENTS 
56 
s E L E c T I 0 N s 
Candidate Commanders Per Cent All Respondents Per Cent 
A .•.•..•...•..... 21 17. l 51 17.2 
B •..•...••.•.... 8 6. 5 34 11.5 
c ............... 51 41.5 112 3 7. 9 
D ..... • ......... l7 13. 8 36 12.3 
E ......•........ 23 18.7 53 17. 9 
None ...•......... 3 2.4 9 3. l 
Total 123 99. 9 295 99. 9 
In profile, (See Figure 10, page 57, which is the plotted data from 
Table VI), only Candidate B seems to not be in agreement with the' 
choices of the total group. All other choices do compare favorably and 
the author was unable to dis cover any significant reasons why Candidate, 
B did not receive. a more favorable comparison. However, as Figure 10, 
page 57, shows, the selection was in the same direction so that any' 
discrepancy might be explained as a variation by chance alone. 
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CANDIDATE SELECTIONS IN RELATION TO ALL 
RESPONDENTS' CANDIDATE SELECTIONS 
Content analysis of commanders 1 remarks. As a result of ' 
reex;arnining each commander's remarks about the reasons he selected 
one candidate over the others, two factors became apparent. Most 
commanders relate their information officer requirements with the 
actual necessities of the present--or with the immediate past--by 
qualifying the candidate of their choice to fit the job with such comments 
like"·· .at this command ..• " or"· .. in this job .... 11 The other factor 
was that on a quantative basis alone, about the same proportions of 
co,'rnmander respondents made comments in the various categories as 
I 
did. all respondents. This relationship is readily observable in both 
I 
Ta;ble VII and Figure 11, page 59, (a profile based on datafroni Table VII). 
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TABLE VII 
COMPARISON OF COMMANDER RESPONDENTS' REMARKS 
WITH ALL RESPONDENTS 1 REMARKS 
Remarks 
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by all Remarks by Commanders 
Respondents 
Comment 
Category en 
en ;:I !-1 0 .-< Q) Q) Ill ...., 
en 1j !-1 :;! >1 ..... 0 >1 
..'<: ~ ;:::1 .... ...., !-1 Q) ~ k Q) Ill l) 
"' Q) 0 .-< l) s '1J u !-1 !>< Ill !-1 Ill en Q) §< ..... !-1 Q) Q) Q) .... !>< 0 Q) 
><i p... ~~ 0 (/) E-< p... 
E d.ucat:ion ........••..... 167 16.2 11 40 21 72 16.2 
Speaking Ability* ......... 149 14.4 12 37 19 68 15.3 
Writing A bil.ity .... , ...... 130 12. 6 10 33 17 60 13.5 
Loyalty .•....•.•........ 130 12.6 8 28 15 51 ll. 5 
Extrovert . .............. 100 9.7 10 23 16 49 ll. 0 
Gets Along with People ..• 76 7.3 7 20 8 35 7.9 
Creativity •......•....... 75 7.2 9 15 6 30 6.7 
Well Read •• ,,, .......... 49 4.7 4 7 3 14 3. 1 
Plans Ahead. ,. ........... 45 4.3 2 7 7 16 3.6 
Delegates Responsibility .. 45 4.3 2 10 8 20 4.5 
Big Picture Concept ...... 33 3.2 2 7 4 13 2. 9. 
Stays in Background ...... 31 3.0 4 6 5 15 3.3 
Total 1030 99.5 81 233 129 443 99.5 
*This category also includes 
In feet ability as well as the obvious 
the subjective nuance of thinking 
ability to make public addresses. 
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COMMANDER RESPONDENTS AND ALL RESPONDENTS 
Neither the qualitative nor the quantitative analysis of the remarks ' 
or selections by the commander respondents produced any appreciable 
differences. But the breakdown of their remarks did serve to 
demonstrate that all these military management respondents generally 
agree upon their requirements for their information officers since 
their selections and comments tend to follow the same pattern. The 
greatest agreement occurs in the emphasis upon communicative ability 
--as related to the specific task at hand- -which demonstrates that 
these respondents, who mu·st be considered as successful military 
inanagement representatives, are very much aware of the public 
I 
~elations fundamental concerning understandable communication. But ' 
lrowess of expression is not their only requirement. 
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As mentioned earlier when the author's alter~ concept was 
being developed, some persons who are skilled communicators profess 
to be public relations practitioners but are not. They lack a moral 
responsibility which the military information officer must have just by 
virtue of being an officer. This factor was therefore not introduced in 
this survey. However, this survey did demonstrate that even though 
an information officer might have very desirable communicative ability, 
certain other attributes are more attractive to certain "employers" 
than to others. Truly this alone gives substance to the concept that 
the military information officer is the alter ego of military management 
--as represented by the general officers who responded to this survey. 
T):Lere are reasons beyond technical skills why one person can work 
successfully with some, and another equally (technically) qualified 
person cannot. In the author's opinion, this can be answered by the 
alter ego concept of public relations; and this survey has reinforced 
that belief, 
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CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Good military management does not just happen. Good military 
public relations does not just happen. The two are complimentaril~ 
inseparable. 
Historical data as well as the knowledge gained from this surve)[ 
tend to show that there is a strong relationship between being a. 
successful military commander and the employment of communicativE\ 
techniques that gain effective understanding. Present day military', 
management--as represented by the general officers of the Air Force 
who responded to this survey--recognizes the need for professionally 
trained public relations practitioners in uniform. 
While military management will always obviously seek officers 
who are educationally trained, technically proficient, and emotionally 
adjusted--no matter what the job- -it is the author 1s belief that the , 
requirements for a military .·information officer go beyond the basic 
requisites. From the data gained from this survey, the author believes 
that regardless of the education, technical proficiency, and emotional 
adjustment of a given information officer, his ability to fit as the alter 
I -
~go of the commander is more vital than for other officers doing other 
-~-
t\.sks. This fact was demonstrated in the survey by offering several 
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information officer candidates • Each met certain basic :requirement~: 
. in education, technical skills, and emotional adjustment, But the 
selection of one over the others was as diversified as the commanders: 
who made selections- -they picked the man who would best be their alter' 
---, 
ego. This was demonstrated when respondents made a choice between' 
candidates equal in technical skill and education but who possessed', 
different personality traits or degrees of difference in the samei 
personality traits. The reasons for selecting a particular candidate; 
tend to indicate what is probably an obvious truth that people employ• 
those with whom they can best work. 
I 
Since it is not practicable for one certain information officer to' 
always work for one certain commander during their military careers,! 
it is the author 1 s belief that an information officer must be more 
capable in being the alter ego than other officers doing other jobs, For, 
example, the military information officer must be able to be both an, 
extrovert and stay in .the background as the situation demands. To put; 
it another way, he must possess those attributes of each of the five, 
candidates in the survey as needed to successfully operate as the alter!, 
ego of'the commander with whom he is presently assigned. Obviously 
:riot everyone can be a successful information officer; certain types of 
' ~eople will never qualify for such demands or dedication. Likewise, 
lot every successful information officer can be the alter ego of every 
! ---- ' 
commander. The law of averages alone will prevent such utopia. 
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also dangerous to assume that an officer who can successfully 
be .the alter ego of a commander can therefore be successful as an 
information officer. Not everyone can assimilate the requirements of 
education, technical proficiency, and emotional adjustment in the proper 
balance. However, many officers are potentially capable of developing 
into information officers and military management should establish 
more opportunities for their emergence. 
Also, since this survey indicated the great stress placed upon 
communicative prowess of otherwise qualified information officers, it 
is the author's belief that military management would benefit greatly if 
additional opportunities for more training were established for those 
who are already successful in the military public relations field. This 
suggestion is not restricted to formal academic training, but as one 
respondent recommended, 11 ••• send information officers to periodically 
work with the various media. 11 Such temporary duty assignments with 
wire services, magazines, radio -television networks, and -newspapers 
would be invaluable to all concerned- -the media, the information officer, 
·and the military services. Military management would certainly gain 
since their alter ego information officer would (after such "training-
with-industry" experience} be better capable of 
Janagement in the fulfillment of management's 
I 
erectively understood. 
technically assisting 
responsibility to be 
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CHARLES RIVER CAMJ'US • 640 COMMONWEALTH A VENUB • BOSTON 15, MASSACHUSETTS 
Scbool of Public Relations and Communications October 12, 1959 
#P.tb, 
Commander, 
If I "' c:z:,_ a ··,;;, ;;;a, 
Dear Sir& 
The Communications· Research Center of this School is engaged in 
conducting a survey in connection with a thesis of an AFIT graduate student, 
Major RnJ.ph N. Dove, His study ·concerns the "Relationship between the 
Principles of Public Relations and SUccessfUl Milit,~ry Management." 
This survey has been coordinated with the Director, Office of 
Information, Secretary of the Air Force--and it is based upon data obtained 
by Major Dove during interviews with.the Director's office and other officers• 
Because of your recognized experience, you will be able to help us 
by completing the attached questionna:lre and let us have the benefit of your 
opinions. Although the questionnaire is simple, it is of vital i~ortance 
that your reply reflect your own, personal conclusions. 
You may return the answer sheet signed or unsigned, If you choose 
to sign it, your anonymity will be protected. A stamped, addressed envelope 
is provided for your convenience. 
We here at the Center believe the objectives of Major Dove's thesis 
are sound and worthy of this appeal for your cooperation, assistance, and 
time, The completion of his work should be of considerable value not only to 
the University but also to the Air Force in the selection and training of · 
Information Officers. The results of his work will be available upon request 
through standard inter-library loan procedures following February, 196o. 
Very sincerely yours, 
:z:~/2-t~ .. 
EDW J. ROBINSON, Ph.D. 
Cha an 
Communications Research Center 
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HYPOTHETICAL SELECTION OF AN 
INFORMATION STAFF OFFICER 
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You have been given a rare opportunity. Instead o:f USAF DCS/ 
Personnel screening and selecting an officer to possibly fill a vacancy 
on your staff, they have arranged for you to interview about 20 avail-
able officers so that you will be able to make your own selection. The 
officer you select will be your personal staff Information Officer. 
You have narrowed the candidates down to :five. Oddly enough, 
each. of these five individuals has certain specific characteristics in 
common. Such factors they have in common make it possible for you. 
to select any one of the five with a reasonable degree of satisfaction 
abou.t your choice, 
All five of the candidates are about the same age--ranging from 
34 to 36 years o£ age. Each is a Captain and each one most likely will 
be promoted on the next promotion list. Each has a primary AFSC o£ 
7211. Each has ten years of accumulated service--a£ which approxi-
mately four and one half years were during WW II. Each went to 
college after WW II and acquired his Bachelor's degree. Each was 
called back into the Air Force during the Korean War; and during the 
past two years, each became a Regular Officer. 
Before WW II and before recall, each of these five candidates 
was a civilian. Individually each one 1s accumulative civilian job 
experience represents between seven and eight years. While they 
were civilians, each one was active in civic-community organizations. 
There is no doubt that each one of these five could easily make. a 
success out of civilian life again; but each one now prefers a career ~n 
the Air Force. Although not physically identical, each one o£ these 
five presents about the same dignified appearance. And each one of 
them has--as you have been able to discern--a keen but subtle sense 
of humor. 
You have screened the records of all the candidates. You have 
ally interviewed all of them--and while interviewing them, you 
person . th Al 'th the records, these have dictated observat~ons about em. eng w~ . 
comments have helped you to narrow the list down to f~ve; ~ut.now you 
have to select one from these five acceptables. The only d~stl~ct 
differences among the five candidates are to be found in the bnef hen 
comments (which are on the following page) that you have made w 
interviewing them. 
Whom would you select? 
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CANDIDATE A: Has a BA in Liberal Arts. His loyalty to the 
AF and immediate superior is above question. He is usually able to 
express himself in writing, and has demonstrated average ability to 
think on his feet. Definitely has a "big picture" concept of the AF. 
73 
Has demonstrated ability to plan ahead and .can delegat,e responsibility 
so as to obtain the most from subordinates. He is well read. While 
analytical in his approach he is also creative. He keeps himself in the: 
background and he usually gets along with people. ' 
CANDIDATE B: Has a BA in Liberal Arts (with a Journalism 
major), Has an exceptional ability to express himself in writing but 
seems reluctant to express himself on his feet. He appears to possess, 
a "big picture" concept of the AF. He has demonstrated ability to plan : 
ahead and can delegate responsibility so as to obtain the most from 
subordinates. He is well read. He is analytical in his approach to 
p:roblems but he is also creative in solving them. He keeps himself in 
the background and he gets along with people. 
CANDIDATE C: Has a BS in Journalism. His loyalty to the AF 
ahd i·rnmediate superior appears to be at least equal to his own interests. 
Has an exceptionally fast ability to think on his feet and has an outstand~ng 
ability to express himself in writing. Has a "big picture 11 .concept of the 
AF and is very well read. Extremely creative, he has always been able 
to get along with people. Has a tendency to be an extrovert. 
CANDIDATE D: Has a BS in Journalism. His loyalty to the AF 
and immediate superior is above question. While usually able to expre~s 
himself in writing, he has demonstrated average ability to think on his 
feet. Definitely has a "big picture" concept of the AF. He has 
demonstrated ability to plan ahead and he can delegate responsibility 
so as to obtain the most from subordinates. He is analytical in his 
approach to problems. He is creative. He keeps himself in the 
background and usually gets along with people. 
CANDIDATE E: Has a BA in Liberal Arts. His loyalty to the 
.AF and his immediate superior appears to be at least equal to his own 1 
irlterests. He has an exceptionally fast ability to think on his feet. He 
hAs an outstanding ability to express himself in writing. He is very . 
wkll read and he has a "big picture" concept of the AF. He is extremely 
c~eative. He has always been able to get along with people and he 
a~pears to be an extrovert. 
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check your choice of candidate: IJlease 
GJ GJ GJ GJ GJ 
If you will, it would also be appreciated if you would briefly 
summarize the reasons of your choice in this space: 
' 
Your rank: 
Accumulatively, how many D General 
years of command experience 
Lieutenant General D 
have you had? Major General D I 
years. Brigadier General 0 
Please return this answer sheet to Boston University in the 
stamped, addressed envelope attached. Thank you. 
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SELECTION EFFECT OF CANDIDATES' POSITION 
IN SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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